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Discussant's Response to "The Relative 
Importance of Auditing to the Accounting 
Profession: Is Auditing a Profit Center?" 
Zoe-Vonna Palmrose 
University of California at Berkeley 
Oh, we still have a few national institutions of trust left . . . Lawrence 
Welk, Walter Cronkite, Roy Rogers, penicillin, Mary Tyler Moore, 
Price Waterhouse, and hot chicken soup. But everything is under 
scrutiny, including our own existence.1 
The Walker and Doll paper discusses forces behind, and consequences of, 
increased competition in the audit services market, using the question—"Is 
auditing a profit center?" Some might find this question inappropriate, because 
it appears to undermine the profession's reason for existence. Others might 
find it curious to question the viability of a service over which the profession 
has a virtual monopoly. However, I found the question both interesting and 
useful, even before recent events made it timely.2 In my opinion, scrutinizing 
the role of auditing in the Big Eight's scheme of services can enhance our 
understanding of the market. 
My comments focus on two major areas. First, I comment on what appears 
missing or only implied in this discussion of competition, specifically some 
benefits of competition. Here, recognize that I am biased. I view competition as 
generally a good thing. Of course, this view comes easily since I am removed 
from the upheavals and uncertainties of life in the trenches. I sympathize with 
individuals facing difficulties imposed by competitive forces. And, I am curious 
to understand these forces. But I lack empathy towards laments for "the good 
old days of auditing"—days of excess demand and fundamental impediments to 
competition. My comments on the benefits of competition reflect these biases. 
Second, my comments focus on issues raised by Walker and Doll relating to 
quality and pricing of audit services. The profession debates whether auditing is 
a commodity. Extant empirical research encompasses a similar question—"Are 
audit services homogeneous or differentiated?" My comments on quality and 
pricing of audit services reference insights from portions of this research. 
Benefits of Competition 
Increased efficiencies represent a major benefit of competition. Walker and 
Doll mention improvements in audit efficiencies, primarily through use of 
1 Bombeck, E., "Will America Regain Its Trust?" Newsweek (November 19, 1979), p. 138 
2 Berton, L., "Andersen Chief of Consulting Relieved of Role," The Wall Street Journal (May 19, 
1988), p. 2 
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technology. However, their discussion of efficiencies occurs in the context of 
developments strengthening the career attractiveness of accounting and 
auditing. The discussion completely ignores any client benefits, including audit 
fee reductions, from increased efficiencies in auditing. Although Walker and 
Doll bemoan pressures to reduce fees, such pressures entail positive signs. To 
some extent, fee pressures reflect current efficiencies and promote future 
ones. 
Regrettably, Walker and Doll (like others outside Big Eight firms) found 
cost and profit data unavailable for assessing the viability of auditing. Instead, 
the authors use revenue data. Rather than debate the merits of these data, let 
me address several issues not in the paper. First, casual evidence suggests that 
partner reductions in some Big Eight firms during 1983-1987 contributed to 
growth statistics when using an average revenue per partner measure (Table 4 
in Walker and Doll paper). Such partner reductions reflect attempts to enhance 
efficiencies in audit practices because of competitive pressures (see PAR, April 
1985). 
Second, in discussing audit revenue growth, Walker and Doll identify 
segments of the market with expanding demand, particularly initial public 
offerings (IPO's). I realize that the paper focuses on Big Eight firms. 
Nonetheless, from a competitive standpoint, non-Big Eight firms comprise a 
significant portion of the IPO market. For example, based on data from 
approximately 3,600 IPO's, non-Big Eight firms had about 40% of the market 
throughout the period 1970-1985 [Palmrose, 1987]. In addition, both the type 
of underwriter and the terms of offerings seem to influence the choice of 
auditor [Simunic and Stein, 1987]. 
In addition to increased efficiencies, the availability of information on audit 
services and fees represents another benefit from changes in the competitive 
environment. Walker and Doll express some regret that audit committees not 
only have, but actually use this information. Frankly, I am encouraged that audit 
committees exercise their oversight responsibilities. 
In summary, increased efficiencies and information, both beneficial to 
clients, represent consequences of competition in the audit services market. 
However, a fundamental concern regarding any adverse impact on audit quality 
as a by-product of increased competition remains. This leads to my second area 
of comments. 
Quality and Pricing of Audit Services 
Empirical research supports the existence of quality-differentiated audit 
services in the market as a whole. The evidence suggests not only that quality 
differences exist but also that higher quality services translate into higher audit 
fees [Francis and Simon, 1987; Palmrose 1986a]. 
However, evidence becomes problematic when comparing among Big Eight 
firms. Studies have found that market participants perceive differences among 
the Big Eight [Arnett and Danos, 1979; Shockley and Holt, 1983; Simunic and 
Stein, 1987]. Yet, evidence remains weak when using revealed behavior of 
market participants via measures including audit fees and auditor litigation. For 
example, I tested for pricing differentials among Big Eight firms with industry 
specializations and failed to detect any significant audit fee differences between 
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industry specialists and non-specialists [see Palmrose, 1986a]3. Other stud-
ies identify one Big Eight firm [Simunic, 1980], or several Big Eight firms 
[Balachandran and Simon, 1988], with significantly different audit fees, 
although this evidence should be viewed as preliminary. Likewise, examina-
tion of litigation activities among Big Eight firms reveals some significant 
differences. However, results appear sensitive to the measure of litigation 
activities and, therefore, cannot be considered unambiguous [Palmrose, 
1988a]. 
To summarize this area of research, evidence supports quality-differ-
entiation in the audit services market as a whole. However, evidence does not 
provide clear indications of differentiation within the Big Eight. 
Evidence on price cutting behavior represents a somewhat more fruitful 
area of research in terms of insights. Here the literature provides an 
economic explanation for low-balling consistent with competition in the 
market for audit services [see DeAngelo, 1981]. Furthermore, a recent 
study by Simon and Francis [1988, p. 255] contains the following findings on 
pricing with auditor changes: 
• Significant fee reductions occur in the initial year of auditor change 
that average 24% of normal fee levels for ongoing engagements. 
• In each of the next two years, fee reductions average 15%. 
• By the fourth year, fees increase to normal levels for continuing 
engagements. 
Perhaps the central issue in the Walker and Doll paper involves the effect 
of non-audit services on the pricing and quality of audit services. From the 
perspective of empirical research, several studies document that audit fees 
are higher when clients also purchase non-audit services from their auditor 
[Palmrose, 1986b; Simunic, 1984]. Although not the only interpretation for 
this result, higher audit fees are inconsistent with auditing as a loss leader for 
non-audit services. 
Furthermore, in comparing the relative importance of audit and non-audit 
services to the Big Eight, Walker and Doll may be understating the vital role 
of audit clients in generating non-audit service revenues.4 In a study of over 
350 public and closely-held companies, nearly 80% of the companies 
purchased some non-audit services (tax or management consulting services) 
from their incumbent auditors, while only three percent of the companies 
purchased non-audit services exclusively from other public accounting firms 
[Palmrose, 1988b]. It appears that much of the Big Eight's non-audit service 
revenue is derived from services to audit clients. 
However, this begs the question of whether market participants perceive 
auditor independence (quality) problems in conjunction with the growing 
importance of non-audit services to the Big Eight. Certainly, the perception 
of auditors marching to a beat of sell-sell-sell non-audit services while 
conducting audit engagements is troublesome. 
3 Actually, this test involves intra-firm quality-differentiated audit services. 
4 My comments illustrate the economic benefits of joint supply of audit and non-audit services. 
These benefits include auditor reputation or brand name effects. In discussions at the 
Symposium, W. R. Kinney, Jr., emphasized the latter. 
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Concluding Remarks 
There remains one, albeit minor, point made by Walker and Doll that 
requires some attention. It is the following: 
In our view, academicians need to do a better job of attracting quality 
students to their A&A programs. The strong emphasis on research at 
some universities seems to have reduced the emphasis on teaching. We 
believe it is important that experienced instructors who are dynamic in 
the classroom teach at least some sections of "Principles of Account-
ing" as well as upper division electives. 
First, room for debate exists as to whether attracting students to 
accounting and auditing (A&A) careers represents a legitimate role for 
educators. I think not. Next, it is a myth that good researchers are in general 
not good teachers. Frequently, good research and good teaching occur 
together. Furthermore, the profession is mistaken in assuming that because 
good teaching will not guarantee tenure at "research institutions," these 
institutions do not emphasize good teaching. Nonetheless, these comments 
demonstrate that academicians can improve communication with the profession 
regarding the value ascribed to undergraduate education. 
Improved communication between academics and the profession on teach-
ing likewise extends to research. As my comments on Walker and Doll's paper 
scrutinizing the role of auditing in the Big Eight's scheme of services indicate, 
we are trying to understand the same issues. In conclusion, let me emphasize 
how much I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this Symposium to 
discuss some of these issues. 
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